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Abstract— When a user receives personal services from a service 
provider, the service can be of a higher quality if the user pro-
vides more personal information. However, the risk of privacy 
violation could increase. Therefore, this paper proposes a privacy 
protection method that realizes avoidance of unwanted informa-
tion disclosure by controlling disclosable attributes according to 
the results from monitoring two elements: user background in-
formation of the provider and user community status. This is 
done before disclosing individual attributes corresponding to the 
privacy policy (i.e., the required anonymity level) by each user. 
The system architecture based on the aforementioned is also pro-
posed. The validity of the proposed methods was confirmed by a 
desk model. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
When a user receives personal services, such as content 
recommendation service or action support service, from a ser-
vice provider by supplying personal information including 
one‟s lifelog, preference, age, etc., privacy protection is essen-
tial. If the information given to the provider is generally large 
and detailed, the received service quality increases although the 
anonymity level lowers. For privacy protection, the offered 
information should be reduced as much as possible to prevent 
the anonymity level from lowering. This indicates that a trade-
off exists between privacy protection and service quality [1], 
[3].  
When the service quality from the provider is not satisfac-
tory, it is possible to increase it by increasing the offered in-
formation quantity, at the cost of lowering the anonymity level. 
However, in some critical situations, a dilemma whether to 
increase the information quantity or prioritise anonymity arises. 
In such cases, the demand of the withdrawal of information that 
has been disclosed unwillingly is meaningless because it is 
almost impossible to withdraw or cancel information once dis-
closed. Thus, it can be said that this trade-off control is one-
way and has so-called „No Entry Area‟, as shown in Figure 1, 
namely in that area it is impossible to increase the anonymity 
level once lowered such as from (1) to (2).   
Considering these circumstances, this paper proposes a 
method that realizes avoidance of unwanted information dis-
closure by controlling openable attributes (i.e., the attributes 
disclosable as per required anonymity level) according to the 
results from monitoring two elements: the user background 
information of the provider (i.e., the information that the ser-
vice provider already possesses about the user) and the user 
community status (i.e., head count etc. of the community in-
cluding the user) that influences the anonymity level. This 
monitoring is done before disclosing individual attributes cor-
responding to the privacy policy (hereafter the required ano-
nymity level) set by each user. This paper aims to propose such 
privacy protection methods to enable service acquisition corre-
sponding to the offered information without any unintended 
personal information leakage.  
 
Figure 1.   One-way Trade-off Control 
This paper is organized as follows: in SectionⅡ, the related 
works are described, and different problems are analysed in 
Section Ⅲ.The proposed methods are described in Section 
Ⅳ.In Section Ⅴ, evaluation and validity verification are dis-
cussed. In Section Ⅵ, the architecture is described, followed by 
an outline of future works in Section Ⅶ. Finally, Section Ⅷ 
concludes this paper.  
II. RELATED WORKS 
Relevant works [1]-[15] were analysed on the basis of the 
following three viewpoints.  
A. Storage Location of Personal Information and Disclosing 
Condition 
In many cases, personal information of each user is stored 
in a secure server located between users and providers, and 
then batch processing, such as data analysis or anonymization, 
is carried out in bulk [4], [5], [9], [12], [13]; this architecture 
concept is adopted in this paper. The privacy policy that in-
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cludes the purpose of the use of personal information or the 
required anonymity level (i.e., identifying probability) is col-
lated from users and providers, and on satisfying certain condi-
tions, personal information is disclosed [3], [4], [5], [10], [11], 
[14]; disclosing condition of this paper is original such as to be 
proposed afterwards. 
B. Privacy Protection methods and Specific individual 
identification 
For policies having different aforementioned collations, it is 
impossible to disclose information, although some ways such 
as obeying the dictates of the user are taken to make progress 
[1], [2], [6], [7], [12], [13]. Techniques that make information 
granularity blunt or rough, except the K-anonymity method 
[10] are used to manage anonymity [3], [5]; the concept of K-
anonymity method is adopted in this paper. Specific individual 
identification is possible in systems that handle information 
such as name [1], [8], [12], [14]; however, in many cases it is 
impossible because of various privacy protection techniques [2], 
[7]. It is possible to identify a unique individual by using a 
technique called „shadow attack‟ that monitors users of the 
services provided from the server [11]; to prevent specific indi-
vidual identification by privacy protection is the final goal of 
this paper.  
C. Explicit trade-off control  
Although almost all related works do not refer to the trade-
off between anonymity and service, some works explicitly 
consider it. One trade-off is the balance between the received 
services and the offered attributes achieved via user hands-on 
control [1], [4], [6], and the other is a system that searches for 
the type and granularity of openable attributes automatically 
by using the machine learning technique [3]. The user‟s load 
cannot be neglected in the former, and in the latter some ser-
vices cannot be utilized. A research on the trade-off between 
privacy and trust [15] suggests the presence of inherent affin-
ity between trust and service. 
Although the aforementioned works discuss the trade-off, 
very few describe user background information and user com-
munity status that influences the anonymity level. However, 
when considering that various new services and applications 
that utilize lifelogs collected from blogs or social network ser-
vices spread and circulate in the network, privacy protection is 
important. This is achieved by careful control of the anonymity 
level and the disclosable attributes from the trade-off stand-
point, and that is the aim of this paper.  
III. PROBLEM  ANALYSIS 
A. Prerequisite Framework 
The prerequisite framework describing the two elements: 
the user background information of the provider and the user 
community status, can be considered to be similar to that 
found in the literature; this framework includes a secure server 
between users and providers that stores personal information 
and performs various processes such as anonymization. The 
secure server is called the privacy protection server (PPS) in 
this paper and performs maximum privacy protection on the 
basis of careful trade-off control by considering the two ele-
ments. It uses the concept of K-anonymity [10] that ensures 
anonymity by controlling the number of people having the 
same attribute that is more than the K constant. Figure 2 
shows this framework with a series of processes from (1) Per-
sonal Information and Required Anonymity Level to (4) Ser-
vice Contents. Relevant specific architecture is described in 
Section Ⅵ.   
 
Figure 2.   Prerequisite Condition Framework 
B. Two problems  
1) Problem1: Dealing with user background information  
Here, let numerical value L be the required anonymity level, 
a set of attributes R be the openable attributes corresponding to 
L and function f (L) = R. In order to avoid careless entry of 
unintended information disclosure in the „No Entry Area‟ 
shown in Figure 1, it is possible, without any careless disclo-
sure of all R, to gradually increase the openable attributes from 
R´ (f (L + α) = R´) to R (#R = #R´ + β) by lowering the ano-
nymity level stepwise from L + α to L with monitoring the ser-
vice quality [18]. Here, α and β are positive integers.  
If the provider has a set of attributes M as the user back-
ground information, by combining M with R´, the substantial 
attributes disclosed to the provider will be M + R´. This indi-
cates that it is possible for the substantial anonymity level to 
lower below L, and consequently such unintended disclosure 
could happen. Figure 3 shows these aspects. To this end, it is 
necessary to search for the user background information of the 
provider before disclosing the information and take some ap-
propriate measures according to the results.  
 
Figure 3.  How to deal with the openable attributes 
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2) Problem2: Dealing with community status  
It is unavoidable that cases such as the required anonymity 
level cannot be defended, occur because of changes in the 
community status as long as the anonymity level is based on K-
anonymity. Even if a moving average or some regularized indi-
cator is applied to reduce the influence of the change, it is not 
completely eliminated.   
Therefore, in this paper, disclosing control of the openable 
attributes is performed along with informing the user about the 
openable attributes in advance by sensing such changes. Thus, 
it is possible to reflect the user‟s intention in disclosing control 
of attributes beforehand. It resembles an advanced demand 
signals scheme (ADS) [19] that controls the signals beforehand 
by measuring traffic flow towards the intersection. Figure 4 
shows these situation. 
 
Figure 4.  How to deal with community change 
IV. PROPOSED METHODS 
A. Anonymizing and disclosing control 
The K value cannot be used as the anonymity level for each 
user because it changes according to the community scale. 
Therefore, the required anonymity level L is introduced that 
has four levels that decrease in the order of 3, 2, 1 and 0. The 
value of K corresponding to each level of L is appropriately 
determined depending on the community scale. The PPS 
shown in Figure 2 determines the openable attributes according 
to L of each user by monitoring consolidated personal informa-
tion, and then discloses them to providers after proper proc-
esses as proposed afterwards. The decision tree learning algo-
rithm is applied to control the disclosing attribute group and 
order [4].   
In general, a selective attribute in the decision tree learning 
algorithm is identified for efficient classification and fast ac-
cess to the target object by choosing attributes such as informa-
tion gain that generates big entropy. However, on the contrary, 
in this paper, an inefficient decision tree is generated for the 
unintended disclosure of the target object (i.e., privacy protec-
tion object) by using such attribute because the entropy is com-
paratively low; as a result, by using this tree, privacy is pro-
tected. Hereafter, a specific case is illustrated.  
TableⅠ shows the personal information of a group of peo-
ple in an airport waiting room. The table shows the entropy 
when classified according to each attribute value. For the case 
of Alice, when classified by gender, the entropy is calculated 


























TABLE I.  PRIVACY INFORMATION OF A GROUP 
 
 
Figure 5.   Decision Trees of Alice 
Thus, as shown in Figure 5, although the efficient decision 
tree needs only two in-depth attributes to specify the object, the 
inefficient tree needs four in-depth attributes for the same. The 
inefficient classifying tree is used for privacy protection. The 
attributes are individually disclosed from such an attribute be-
cause the object is not easily specified. In particular „Job: Stu-
dent → First Trip: Yes → Goal: USA‟ becomes a disclosing 
order. However, in order to avoid complex processes all 
openable attributes determined by L are disclosed simultane-
ously not individually in the following section.    
B. Proposed Method 1 (For Status of Service Provider) 
1) Technique to avoid the influence of user background 
information  
Figure 6 shows a situation where the provider has some 
user background information. The user discloses the attributes 
„a‟ and „b‟ that are determined to be openable by the required 
anonymity level L = 2. If the provider already has the user 
background information equivalent to attribute „c‟, the substan-
tial anonymity level lowers from L = 2 to L = 1 by combining 
„a‟ and „b‟ to „c‟. 
 
Figure 6.  Influence of user background information 
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Using Table Ⅰ, the following situation can be assumed. 
For Alice, the openable attributes corresponding to the re-
quired anonymity level L = 2, indicating K = 3, are „Job: Stu-
dent,‟ „Blood: A‟ or „First Trip: Yes‟, and those are disclosed 
to the provider concerned. It is located in the airport, and so 
possible to acquire beforehand the information such as board-
ing members list including name, nationality, destination and 
first-time overseas travellers etc.; accordingly the provider can 
select three people Alice, Bob and MikeJ when received the 
„First Trip: Yes‟ attribute. Under the circumstances, if the pro-
vider acquires information that MikeJ was in a French embassy 
three hours ago from a location service provider, MikeJ‟s 
„Goal‟ is possibly France. Thus, the target person having at-
tributes such as „Job: Student,‟ „Blood: A‟ or „First Trip: Yes‟ 
is Alice or Bob, which indicates that the substantial anonymity 
level lowers from the initial level L = 2 (K = 3) to L = 1 (K = 
2), then the required anonymity level cannot be defended .   
In order to avoid this, this paper proposes a certain method 
(Proposed method 1) that appropriately changes disclosing 
control of attributes according to the results obtained from 
monitoring the user background information before disclosing 
openable attributes corresponding to the required anonymity 
level. Contents and procedures are shown in each step in Figure 
7, illustrating the conditions of the selected sample as follows 
together with TableⅠor Figure 6:  
In step (1), the candidate provider is appropriately searched 
for by the query words composed of attributes common to all 
users.  An example of a query is „(Gender: Male, Female), 
(Job: Student, Business), (Blood: A, AB, O, B), (First Trip: 
Yes, No), (Goal: USA, UK, France, Italy)‟ like the LCM (least 
common multiple).   
In step (2), each user selects several providers, each de-
noted by H, of his/her choice among the providers that were 
searched for by step (1).  
In step (3), the appropriate pages of each selected provider 
site are downloaded and are to be searched for the same attrib-
utes of each user from the viewpoint of how much of each 
user‟s attribute is included in the pages. For the case of Mike, 
instance of such attributes is ‘Gender: Male, Job: Business, 
Blood: A, First Trip: No, Goal: UK’. 
 
Figure 7.   User Background Information Search Flow  
In step (4) and (5), the service is received by disclosing 
openable attributes corresponding to the required anonymity 
level L from the provider that is considered not to have attrib-
utes exceeding the range of the openable attributes. For exam-
ple, if L = 2 in Figure 4, only the provider that does not have 
„c‟ and „d‟ attributes will be able to provide some services. 
In step (6), as for the other providers, it is possible that 
they may not maintain the L level when disclosing openable 
attributes, therefore each user retries after changing the L level, 
or the service itself should be cancelled; this is one process for 
the trade-off between privacy protection and service quality. 
2) Technique to search for user backgroud information 
Considering all attributes of each user that have already 
been registered in PPS, the target is to find the number of the 
same attributes in the provider site. In particular, by using the 
pair of words of the attributes and its values, the co-occurrence 
frequency of the pair is measured. As for the co-occurrence 
level of a pair of words, two typical coefficients are used as the 
index of relativity between the pair: the Jaccard coefficient and 
the Simpson coefficient [16]. In this paper, the Jaccard coeffi-
cient is used considering that the paired words have a tendency 
to appear simultaneously and it is important to determine 
whether the target site also has this tendency. Jaccard coeffi-
cient functions properly in such case.  
If the number of such pairs offered from the user and the 
chosen providers in step (2) in Figure 5 are assumed to be P 
and H, respectively, co-occurrence level J (the Jaccard coeffi-
cient) of each pair of words is shown as a two-dimensional 
array. Assuming P and H for the first and second dimensions, 
respectively, J is defined as follows.  
J = [[J11, J12,  … , J1p], [J21, J22, … , J2p], … ,  
[Jh1, Jh2, … , Jhp]] 
Among P pairs, if the number of the pair that can be dis-
closed by level L is assumed to be R, the number of the pair 
that cannot be disclosed is Q = P − R. For a certain provider, if 
any Jhp value of each of the Q pairs does not exceed a certain 
threshold level T, such a provider can be considered not to 
have user background information about Q, and then the ser-
vice can be received by only offering the attributes R, openable 
corresponding to level L, as described in step (4) and (5). Con-
versely, if any Jhp value of each of the Q pairs exceeds the 
threshold level, the service cannot be received from such pro-
vider.   
C.  Proposed Method 2 (For  Status of User Community) 
As stated in Section Ⅲ, the required anonymity level L 
cannot be defended because of the community status change. 
Therefore, to defend L, it is necessary to control the disclosing 
attributes according to the current anonymity level. Figure 8 
shows this situation considering the case of Mike as an exam-
ple. Figure 6 (a) shows the initial situation in which Mike has L 
= 2 (K = 3) and the three attributes, „Male‟, „A‟ and „No‟ can 
be disclosed. Figure 6 (b) shows that the anonymity level in-
creases because two members having same attributes as those 
of Mike join the group; thus, another attribute „Busi‟ can be 
disclosed. Figure 6 (c) shows the opposite situation; therefore,  
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Figure 8.   Changes of Anonymity  
the openable attribute should only be limited to „Male‟ to de-
fend L. 
In order to simplify the influence of community change, 
there are some methods such as using regularized entropy in 
the anonymity level calculation [4] or a certain attribute dis-
closing index considering lifelog statistics and community 
character. In spite of these methods, the influence cannot be 
easily simplified, and thus cannot be considered as a suitable 
solution.  
We propose an advance agreement attribute disclosing con-
trolling method (Proposed method 2), namely reflecting the 
user‟s intention in advance. It is outlined as follows: the 
method senses momentarily information in advance such as the 
number of people moving toward the service area or the attrib-
utes associated with those people; forwards those sensed data 
to the server (PPS) in the service area whenever just after 
sensed; forecasts instantly the anonymity level change and the 
openable attributes by analyzing those gathered data; listens to 
the user‟s intention beforehand about attributes to be disclosed; 
and determines whether to disclose additional attributes by 
obtaining user consent. Figure 9 illustrates such essence as the 
described above.Thus, appropriate real time disclosing control 
can be performed according to the current conditions.  Details 
are shown in Section Ⅴ by using a simulator.  
 
Figure 9.  Predicting process Flow 
V. EVALUATION AND VALIDITY VERIFICATION  
A. Evaluation and Validity  forProposed Method 1 
By using the case group in TableⅠ, it is verified that the 
proposed method 1, described in Section Ⅳ- B (Figure 7), is 
appropriate when treating user background information and 
anonymity level, and disclosing attributes from two evaluation 
aspects: (#1) There is no risk in disclosing unintended per-
sonal information, (#2) There is no sacrifice of the unintended 
anonymity level.  
In step (1) in Figure 7, the query words used are common to 
all users, so the anonymity level is the highest and each user 
consents the disclosure of such personal information before-
hand by understanding the purpose of the use. Thus, aspects 
(#1) and (#2) can be realized. In steps (2) and (3), while proc-
essing only one-sided download of the contents of the related 
page of the provider site takes place; thus, aspects (#1) and (#2) 
can be realized. In steps (4) and (5), only when any Jhp value of 
each of the Q pairs does not exceed threshold T, all openable 
attributes R corresponding to L are disclosed and receive the 
service; thus, aspects (#1) and (#2) can be realized. In step (6), 
the processing is performed from the user‟s standpoint; there-
fore, aspects (#1) and (#2) can be realized. Thus, the proposed 
method 1 is verified to be appropriate from both evaluation 
aspects.   
Table Ⅱshows an example of the result of the provider 
searching experiment for user background information in step 
(3) assuming the case of Mike in which L = 2 (K = 3). Here, 
the sites hit by Google are considered as providers. If the 
threshold T is set to be 0.1, because any attribute of the Q 
pairs (non-marked columns) of any provider does not exceed 
T , the services can be received from all three providers. Prac-
tically, such threshold level should be carefully determined 
based on various system conditions. 
TABLE II.  JACCARD COEFFICIENT VALUE OF EACH ATTRIBUTE 
 
B. Evaluation and Validity  forProposed Method 2 
As in the previous section, it is verified that the proposed 
method 2, described in Section Ⅳ- C, is appropriate by using a 
multi-agent simulator [17], [20]. In particular, the possibility of 
real time disclosing control based on an advance agreement 
attribute is considered. That is, acquiring personal information 
of the people moving towards the service area beforehand, in-
forming the user in the service area  of the change of openable 
attributes and negotiating with the user as to which attribute is 
to be opened with high priority may be achieved. Figure 10 and 
Figure 11 show the simulation status. 
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In Figure 10, pedestrian agents assuming customer move 
toward the boarding gate in the airport where after passing A 
area receive services at B area (service area) and pass C area 
toward exit. Various sensing are performed at A area. Key pa-
rameters are At and Bt, that are the average time for an agent to 
pass the A area and the average time to receive the service at 
the B area, respectively, unit time being a step. Other parame-
ters are commonsensibly and properly decided by the simulator. 
The value of the anonymity level is defined to be the number of 
agents in the A or B area having the same attribute as the 
marked agent (user) locating in the B area to receive services.  
 
Figure 10.   Simulation of Community Status Change  
Figure 11 shows the simulation by assuming At = 40 steps 
and Bt = 80 steps; therefore, α = 2 such that Bt = α × At. The 
upper and lower graphs show the situations of the A and Bareas, 
respectively. A(t), A1(t) and A2(t) show the number of people, 
the anonymity level of attribute 1 and the anonymity level of 
attribute 2, respectively, at Time = t steps in the A area. Simi-
larly, B(t), B1(t) and B2(t) correspond to the number of people, 
the anonymity level of attribute 1 and the anonymity level of 
attribute 2, respectively, in the B area. From the graph, B(120) 
≒ A(40) + A(80),  B(160) ≒ A(80) + A(120), ...  or  B1(440) 
≒ A1(360) + A1(400),  B1(480) ≒ A1(400) + A1(440), ... can 
be read, which suggests that the situation in B area can be pre-
dicted from the situation in the A area. This is because B (40n) 
≒ A (40(n-1)) + A (40(n-2)) can be obtained by the average 
value because of Bt  = 2 × At, where n is a positive integer. 
 
Figure 11.   Simulation of Anonymity Change  
That is, the anonymity level of B1(t) in Figure 11 shows 
that it can be predicted at Time = 440 steps that the value of B1 
at Time = 480 steps exceeds the required anonymity level be-
forehand. Then, at Time = 440 steps, it is possible for the user 
to negotiate and decide whether to disclose additional attrib-
utes; thus, an advance agreement disclosing control is possible. 
This suggests that it is verified from the evaluation aspect (#1) 
viewpoint. In contrast, in the situation in which the number of 
already disclosed attributes should be decreased by forecasting, 
it is possible to discontinue disclosing as soon as possible by 
prior notification, and thus the sacrifice of the anonymity level 
can be minimized as per the user‟s consent. Therefore, aspect 
(#2) can be achieved. 
C. Evaluation of the Proposed Methods for Trade-Off 
The proposed methods should be evaluated from the view-
point of the contribution to an effective trade-off between ser-
vice and anonymity from the following two aspects: (a) easy 
and rapid acquiring trade-off point (i.e., the balancing point 
between service and anonymity) and (b) no unintended infor-
mation disclosure and availability of a slightly higher service 
level.  
First, this paper aims to introduce the required anonymity 
level (L) that can be set by each user and notify such users of 
the openable attributes determined by L; thus, the mechanism 
that a phased adjustment is enabled is considered. Moreover, 
although it is usual to individually disclose openable attributes 
in order [3], [18], in this paper, all openable attributes are dis-
closed simultaneously; therefore, the balance point can be effi-
ciently attained. This suggests that the evaluation of aspect (a) 
is clarified. Second, unintended information disclosure can be 
avoided by the proposed method 1 in case the provider has 
some user background information; it is possible to raise the 
service level by increasing information disclosure intentionally 
by the proposed method 2 in case the community status 
changes. This indicates that the evaluation aspect (b) is also 
clarified. 
VI. ARCHITECTUR 
The components that compose PPS are shown in Figure 12.  
(1) In the „Personal Information Holder‟ module, personal 
information etc. offered by each user are kept in the holder as 
a database and managed collectively. 
(2) In the „Query Generator and Provider‟s URL Retriever‟ 
module, query words common to all users are composed and 
supplied to the network to retrieve candidate providers. 
(3) The „User Background Information Retriever‟ module 
retrieves the contents of the URL‟s appropriate pages. 
(4) In the „Openable Attributes Analysis‟ module, both the 
openable and non openable attributes are determined provisio-
nally according to the required anonymity level for each user 
by analyzing the database. 
(5) In the „Openable Attributes Adjusting‟ module, the 
anonymity level is calculated every Δt repeatedly reflecting 
present community status and the openable attributes deter-
mined at (4) are adjusted.  
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(6) In the „Openable Attributes Fixing‟ module, the opena-
ble (or non openable) attributes that were adjusted in (5) are 
approved by users through negotiation, accordingly fixed. 
(7) In the „Jaccard-Coefficient Measure and Check‟ mod-
ule, the similarity between non openable attributes fixed in (6) 
and the equivalent contents of the pages acquired in (3) is 
measured by Jaccard coefficient, and if judged user back-
ground information exist, then some alarm is given to the user.  
(8) In the „Service Retriever‟ module, all the openable 
attributes are disclosed when there is no user background in-
formation in (7) step and proper service contents are retrieved.  
(9) The „Obscuring and Abstracting Process‟ module, al-
though not illustrated in PPS in Figure 2, performs obscuring 
and abstracting properly when such functions are desired to 
avoid privacy violation, although it is future task. 
 
Figure 12.   Components of PPS architecture  
 
VII. FUTURE WORKS 
Some experimental evaluating tests for validity verifica-
tion and specific architecture need further investigation. Espe-
cially, when those two proposed methods are actually applied, 
it is future work to pursue how to combine and coordinate 
them considering various system conditions.  
In the proposed method 1, the threshold used for judging 
user background information and the technique choosing the 
most appropriate page of the provider site are the key prob-
lems to be pursued and should be solved in the future. In the 
proposed method 2 simulation, although the airport was as-
sumed for example, given some conditions defining α and At , 
the application of this method becomes possible in locations 
such as a shopping street or an amusement park. However, 
there are problems because of the differences between simula-
tion and reality or the limitation of the simulation itself, and 
this is also an area for future work. 
Eventually, when lifelogs increase in number, privacy vio-
lation by the secondary use of other providers becomes a big 
problem. Figure 13 shows an example of privacy violation by 
such secondary use; that is, if some lifelogs acquired by a 
separate provider are linked and analysed, the individual im-
age becomes clearer. A key to prevent such analysis is, when 
personal information is offered from one provider to another, 
to ensure the anonymity level required by the original owner 
of the information based on the idea of the proposed methods; 
however, it is a future task. 
 
Figure 13.   Inference by Linkage Analysis  
  
VIII. CONCLUTIONS 
The trade-off existing between privacy protection and ser-
vice quality was discussed. Two problems associated with ap-
propriate trade-off control, namely those with user background 
information of the provider and community status, were treated 
and two counter-measures were proposed. Careful anonymity   
level control through phased adjustment considering user back-
ground information and advance agreement attribute disclosing 
control considering community status are crucial to prevent 
unintended privacy information leakage. 
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